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are subject to municipalities’ police 
powers. Unlike oral speech, signs take 
up space and may obstruct views, 
distract motorists, displace alternative 
uses for land, and pose other problems 
that legitimately call for regulation. It 
is common ground that governments 
may regulate the physical characteris-
tics of signs—just as they can, within 
reasonable bounds and absent censori-
al purpose, regulate audible expression 
in its capacity as noise.7 
Nevertheless, numerous litigants have brought 
claims alleging that temporary sign regulations that 
differentiate between sign types based on the function 
of the sign are content-based and therefore subject to 
strict scrutiny review. Varied judicial responses to these 
claims have led to a split of authority and resulting 
uncertainty in this area of law.8 
The Court’s ruling in Reed may resolve this split. 
Plaintiffs/appellants in Reed are the Good News Com-
munity Church and its pastor, Clyde Reed (collectively, 
“the Church”). Defendants/appellees are the Town 
of Gilbert, Arizona, and Adam Adams in his offi cial 
capacity as the Town’s Code Compliance Manager 
(collectively, “the Town”). The Church is appealing a 
Ninth Circuit order that affi rmed a district court order 
granting summary judgment to the Town and denying 
summary judgment to the Church.9 
The basic facts are as follows. The Church rented 
space at an elementary school in Gilbert, Arizona, and 
placed signs in the surrounding area announcing the 
time and location of the Church’s services. The Town 
has a sign code that restricts the size, number, duration, 
and location of many types of signs, including tem-
porary directional signs. The code generally requires 
anyone who wishes to post a sign to obtain a permit, 
with numerous exceptions for specifi c types of signs 
including “ideological signs,”10 “political signs,”11 and 
“temporary directional signs relating to a qualifying 
event.”12 Treating the Church’s signs as temporary 
directional signs, the Town issued a code enforcement 
notice to the Church, seeking to enforce the code re-
strictions applicable to temporary directional signs. The 
Church then sued the Town, claiming that the sign code 
violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment 
Municipal offi cials 
and attorneys will want to 
watch the Supreme Court 
slip opinions1 in June for 
the Court’s decision in 
Reed v. Town of Gilbert.2 
Depending on how the 
Court decides the case, mu-
nicipalities may need to act 
quickly to amend their sign 
regulations. Indeed, Susan 
Trevarthen, who represent-
ed the American Planning 
Association in its amicus curiae brief in Reed, warns 
“that adoption of the strict scrutiny test [urged by the 
petitioner Clyde Reed] has the potential to invalidate 
nearly all sign codes in the country, and would thereby 
imperil the important traffi c safety and aesthetic pur-
poses underlying local government sign regulation.”3
”Depending on how the Court decides 
[Reed], municipalities may need 
to act quickly to amend their sign 
regulations.”   
As local offi cials and attorneys know, local sign 
ordinances are generally recognized to be part of the 
local government toolkit for advancing substantial 
governmental interests such as traffi c safety and aes-
thetics.4 However, effective regulation of sign place-
ment and aesthetics typically requires the governing 
jurisdiction to categorize signs by type, and such cate-
gorization often requires the regulator to read the sign 
to determine its function, and therefore its category.5 
Thus, because these sign regulations require the 
regulator to review the content of the sign to deter-
mine its category, sign regulations pose distinct First 
Amendment problems for municipalities, which regu-
late the physical characteristics and placement of signs 
as part of the exercise of their police powers. Recogniz-
ing this, a unanimous Court observed in City of Ladue 
v. Gilleo6 that signs present regulatory challenges not 
applicable to other forms of speech:
While signs are a form of expression 
protected by the Free Speech Clause, 
they pose distinctive problems that 
Land Use Law Update: Will Reed v. Town of Gilbert 
Require Municipalities Throughout the Country to 
Rewrite Their Sign Codes? 
By Sarah J. Adams-Schoen
NYSBA  Municipal Lawyer  |  Winter 2015  |  Vol. 29  |  No. 1 17 
tween different types of signs that are 
not suffi ciently connected to safety and 
aesthetic rationales. 18
The Town—joined by amici representing munici-
pal and planning interests19—argues that intermediate 
scrutiny applies to sign ordinances that do not favor or 
censor viewpoints or ideas and the Town’s code does 
not favor or censor viewpoints or ideas.20 Moreover, 
amici in support of the Town argue that the Church’s 
absolutist test would wreak havoc on municipalities’ 
ability to further important traffi c safety and aesthetic 
interests and is not necessary to protect speech because 
a municipality’s review of a temporary sign’s content 
to determine the sign’s function is not a content-based 
review.21 
How will the Court resolve the questions posed in 
Reed? Hopefully by recognizing that review of a sign’s 
text to discern its function does not equate to regula-
tion of the sign’s content, but rather is most often a 
content-neutral safety or land regulation. Although 
clearly implicating free speech concerns, typical
“[c]omprehensive sign regulations are not speech-
licensing or censorship schemes but are chiefl y con-
cerned with the form and appearance of the develop-
ment of land in a variety of zoning settings (residential, 
mixed-use, commercial, industrial, agricultural, and 
the like).”22 Indeed, many local governments, including 
the Town of Gilbert, include beauty, community 
appearance, and safety among the enumerated pur-
poses in their sign regulations.23 These regulations 
cannot be effectively implemented if the municipality 
is hampered in its ability to discern the functions of the 
signs it regulates. As the National League of Cities 
argues in its amicus brief,
Signs are speech and thus can be cat-
egorized or differentiated only by what 
they say. This makes it impossible to 
overlook a sign’s content or message 
in attempting to formulate regulations 
on signage or even make exceptions 
required by law. If the mere categoriza-
tion of signs by function renders them 
“content-based,”…few sign regula-
tions will meet the exacting strict 
scrutiny test.24
An outcome that places local government sign 
codes under strict scrutiny whenever classifi cation of 
sign types requires a review of the sign’s content to 
understand the function of the sign would arguably 
place local governments in an impossible position—
and require local governments to act quickly to amend 
their sign codes.
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment on its face and as applied to the Church.
Following Supreme Court precedent that requires 
intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral regula-
tions,13 the district court found that the sign code was 
a content-neutral regulation that was reasonable in 
light of the government interests underlying the regu-
lations, and therefore passed constitutional muster.14 
The Ninth Circuit agreed and held that, even though 
an offi cial would have to read a sign to determine 
what provisions of the sign code applied, the restric-
tions were not based on the content of the signs, did 
not censor speech or favor certain viewpoints over 
others, and the sign code left open other channels of 
communication for the Church.15
The Town’s permitting exemption for temporary 
signs, and, more specifi cally, its classifi cation of the 
Church’s signs as temporary directional signs, lies 
at the heart of the Reed case. The plaintiff/appellee 
church in Reed—joined by a host of amici representing 
various religious and libertarian interests, ten states, 
and the United States16—argues that if a municipal 
offi cial has to read the content of a temporary sign to 
determine what kind of temporary sign it is, the regu-
lation is “content-based” and subject to strict scrutiny. 
As a result, the Church argues, the Town of Gilbert’s 
sign code is subject to strict scrutiny. Moreover, the 
Church argues that the Town’s code cannot survive 
strict or intermediate scrutiny because the code is not 
narrowly tailored and alternative channels for com-
munication do not exist.17 
The United States, which fi led a brief in support of 
the Church, argues instead that intermediate scrutiny 
applies to the Town’s sign code, but the code fails to 
satisfy that standard. Specifi cally, the United States 
argues 
[I]ntermediate scrutiny applies in the 
particular context of a sign-regulation 
scheme premised solely on the gov-
ernment’s substantial and content-
neutral interests in safety and aesthet-
ics. Those interests have long been 
understood as valid bases for limiting 
the proliferation of signs; they can 
justify not only general limitations on 
signs, but also exceptions for signs 
whose content promotes (or does not 
signifi cantly detract from) safety and 
aesthetics; and the existence of such 
exceptions should not in itself trigger 
strict scrutiny. Even under intermedi-
ate scrutiny, however, respondents’ 
ordinance…draws distinctions be-
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activity, or meeting sponsored, arranged or promoted by a 
religious, charitable, community service, educational, or other 
similar non-profi t organization.” Such signs may be “no greater 
than 6 feet in height and 6 square feet in area”; no more than 
four such signs “may be displayed on a single property at any 
time”; and such signs may be displayed only “12 hours before, 
during, and 1 hour after” the event. They may not be displayed 
in “the public right-of-way” or on “fences, boulders, planters, 
other signs, vehicles, utility facilities, or any structure.” Gilbert 
Sign Code § 4.402.
13. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 
410, 428-29 (1992) (acknowledging that law prohibiting 
newsracks when they contain certain types of publications 
could be content-neutral if distinction based on neutral 
rationales). 
14. No. CV 07-522-PHX-SRB, 2011 WL 5924381 (D. Ariz. Feb. 11, 
2011).
15. 707 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2013). 
16. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae General Conference of 
Seventh-Day Adventists in Support of Petitioners, Reed v. 
Town of Gilbert, 2014 WL 4726502 (Sept. 22, 2014); Brief Amicus 
Curiae of the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty in Support of 
Petitioners, Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 2014 WL 4726503 (Sept. 22, 
2014). 
17. Brief for Petitioners, Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 2014 WL 4631957 
(Sept. 15, 2014); Petitioners’ Reply Brief, Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 
2014 WL 7145497 (Dec. 15, 2014).
18. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 2014 WL 4726504, at *7-8 
(Sept. 22, 2014).
19. Brief of the National League of Cities et al. Supporting 
Respondents, Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 2014 WL 6706843 
(Nov. 21, 2014). The National League of Cities was joined 
in the amicus brief by United States Conference of Mayors, 
National Association of Counties, International City/County 
Management Association, International Municipal Lawyers 
Association, American Planning Association, and Scenic 
America, Inc.
20. Brief for Respondents, Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 2014 WL 6466937, 
at *8-9 (Nov. 14, 2014). 
21. Brief of the National League of Cities, supra n. 19, at *8.
22. Id. 
23. See, e.g., Gilbert Sign Code § 4.401; see also Brief of the National 
League of Cities, supra n. 19, at *6 (arguing same).
24. Brief of the National League of Cities, supra n. 19, at *3.
Sarah J. Adams-Schoen is a Professor at Touro 
Law Center and Director of Touro Law’s Land Use 
& Sustainable Development Law Institute. She is 
the author of the blog Touro Law Land Use (http:// 
tourolawlanduse.wordpress.com), which aims to 
foster greater understanding of local land use law, 
environmental law, and public policy. At Touro Law 
Center, she teaches Property Law, Environmental 
Law and Environmental Criminal Law.
Endnotes
1. According to the Court’s offi cial website, the Court publishes 
slip opinions on its website “within minutes” of issuing its 
bench opinions. See SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 2014 
TERM OPINIONS OF THE COURT, SLIP OPINIONS, PER CURIAMS (PC), 
AND ORIGINAL CASE DECREES (D), http://www.supremecourt.
gov/opinions/slipopinion/14 (last visited Feb. 27, 2015).
2. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 134 S. Ct. 2900 (2014) (granting 
certiorari). The Court heard oral argument in Reed on January 
12, 2015, and a decision is expected by June. An audio 
recording of the oral argument can be accessed at http://
www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2014/13-502 
(last visited Feb. 27, 2015). 
3. WEISS SEROTA HELFMAN COLE & BIERMAN, BLOG, Susan Trevarthen 
Co-Authors Amicus Curiae Brief to the US Supreme Court, http://
www.wsh-law.com/blog/17146/#sthash.LemdFBTW.dpuf 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2015).
4. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954) (recognizing role 
of aesthetics in providing for public welfare); Covenant Media 
of South Carolina v. Town of Surfside Beach, 321 Fed. Appx. 251 
(4th Cir. 2009) (promoting traffi c safety and aesthetics are 
substantial governmental interests).
5. See Wag More Dogs v. Cozart, 680 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(recognizing that categorization for legitimate regulatory 
purposes requires review of sign content); National Advertising 
Co. v. City of Miami, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1376 (S.D. Fla. 2003) 
(recognizing that general rule against regulation of viewpoints 
“is not applicable in cases where ‘there is not even a hint 
of bias or censorship in the [municipality’s] enactment or 
enforcement of an ordinance’”), rev’d on other grounds, 402 F.3d 
1329 (11th Cir. 2005).
6. 512 U.S. 43 (1994).
7. Id. at 48. 
8. Compare Wag More Dogs, 680 F.3d at 365 (recognizing legitimate 
need to review sign content to categorize sign by function) 
with Matthews v. Town of Needham, 764 F.2d 58, 60 (1st Cir. 
1985) (“[Preferring] the ‘functions’ of certain signs over those 
of other (e.g., political) signs is really nothing more than a 
preference based on content.”).
9. The Ninth Circuit order is reported at 707 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 
2013). The district court’s unreported order is available at No. 
CV 07-522-PHX-SRB, 2011 WL 5924381 (D. Ariz. Feb. 11, 2011). 
10. These are defi ned as signs “communicating a message or 
ideas for noncommercial purposes” that do not fall into one of 
several more specifi c categories. The only restriction on these 
signs is that they “be no greater than 20 square feet in area and 
6 feet in height.” Gilbert Sign Code § 4.402(D) and (J).
11. These are defi ned as signs that “support[] candidates for 
offi ce or urge[] action on any other matter” on a national, 
state, or local ballot. Such signs may be up to 16 square feet 
(on residential property) or 32 square feet (on nonresidential 
property) in size; may be up to six feet in height; may remain 
in place for several days after the election; and are not 
generally limited in number. Gilbert Sign Code § 4.402.
12. These are defi ned as signs “not permanently attached to the 
ground, a wall or a building, and not designed or intended for 
permanent display,” that are “intended to direct pedestrians, 
motorists, and other passersby” to “any assembly, gathering, 
